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Abstract—We present a comprehensive investigation into the 
complexity of a new private key storage apparatus: a novel 
silicon photonic physical unclonable function (PUF) based on 
ultrafast nonlinear optical interactions in a chaotic silicon micro-
cavity that is both unclonable and impossible to emulate. This 
device provides remarkable improvements to total information 
content (raw cryptographic material), information density, and 
key generation rates over existing optical scattering PUFs and is 
also more easily integrated with both CMOS electronics and 
telecommunications hardware. Our device exploits the natural 
nonlinear optical behavior of silicon to neutralize commonly used 
attacks against PUFs and vastly enhance device complexity. We 
confirm this phenomenon with thorough experimental results on 
prototype devices and present a detailed estimate of their total 
information content. Our compact, micron-scale approach 
represents an entirely new generation of ultrafast and high 
information density photonic PUF devices that can be directly 
incorporated into integrated circuits to ensure authenticity and 
provide secure physical storage of private key material. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The globalization of the semiconductor manufacturing 
industry provides abundant opportunities to attack 
microelectronic supply chains [1]. Leveraging globalized 
manufacturing is essential for large organizations to nimbly 
benefit from the rapid innovation of the microelectronics 
industry. However, its distributed nature allows for numerous 
points of attack throughout system lifecycles including 
production, deployment, operations, and support. One way to 
protect supply chains is by using advanced cryptographic 
hardware key storage solutions to store small amounts of 
private information on the protected item and permit its 
authentication throughout all points of attack in the chain. At 
these points, microelectronic components are vulnerable to 
tampering, substitution, and duplication of private key material 
stored in digital memory [1]. The high cost and complexity of 
current hardware key storage solutions make their practical 
scalability to low-end systems intractable [2], [3]. Moreover, 
the secure storage of private key material remains a challenge 
for all types of cryptographic systems [4]. 
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) store private 
information in the intrinsic physical structure of a device and 
provide an alternative to the storage of key material in digital 
memory [5], [6]. These devices are most commonly applied to 
authentication applications [7]–[9] and more recently for 
secure key generation [10], [11]. While electronic PUFs remain 
the most common approach, many have been found susceptible 
to cloning, invasive interrogation, and model-building attacks 
[12]–[14]. Optics promises “strong PUFs” [15] through more 
complex physical interactions, and demonstrations thus far 
have leveraged inhomogeneous spatial scattering of light [7]–
[11]. While these optical scattering approaches may offer 
additional security benefits and output complexity when 
compared to electronic PUFs [6], [10], they continue to be 
slow, large (~100 mm3), extremely sensitive to mechanical 
positioning, and difficult to integrate with electronic circuits 
[7]–[11]. Further, as we show here, optical scattering PUFs 
provide a relatively low information density (storage of large 
amounts of cryptographic material in a small space) due to 
their linearity [7]–[11]. 
More precisely, optical scattering PUFs (OSPUFs) have 
exceptionally slow cryptographic key material (“information”) 
generation rates due to requirements to mitigate induced 
heating from the input, the need for narrow linewidth laser 
illumination sources, and camera-based detection methods. 
Additionally, all demonstrated OSPUFs are linear devices, 
which adversely affects their security and their total 
information content. Linear OSPUFs can be attacked by 
machine learning techniques if the raw interference images of 
the PUF are available to the adversary [9]. Successful model-
building attacks have been able to predict the correct response 
to a random and previously unobserved input challenge [9]. 
Also, due to their linear behavior the uncorrelated key count is 
limited to the total number of orthogonal input sequences, as 
such illumination patterns add linearly and coherently [10], 
thus reducing the total information content of the device. These 
non-ideal properties have precluded their practical use even 
after nearly two decades of research and development. 
Recent work on ultrafast silicon micro-cavities has created 
an entirely new generation of optical PUFs that we term 
“photonic PUFs” [16], [17], and which overcome many of the 
challenges faced by OSPUFs. Driving unique, CMOS-
compatible, silicon micro-cavities with spectro-temporally 
encoded, ultrashort optical pulses (Fig. 1) leads to the 
excitation of a large number of transient spatial optical modes 
[18] that mutually interact via the optical nonlinearities of 
silicon [19] and the precise physical structure of the cavity 
itself. Fabrication variances at the nanometer-scale are 
inevitable and form the device’s unique information carrying 
structure. The cavity design is known to exhibit chaotic 
behavior [20] that is manifested in an extreme sensitivity to 
structural variations, thus rendering cloning virtually 
impossible [16]. Guided waves used to couple to and from the 
cavity require no spatial alignment, and the device is therefore 
significantly more robust than optical scattering approaches. 
Further, the device is readily integrated with silicon electronics, 
as it is constructed from the same material and fabrication 
process. By using a broadband source in the near-IR spectrum, 
this photonic PUF is compatible with modern 
telecommunications infrastructure and components. Lastly, the 
ultrafast response (~12 ps) denies an adversary sufficient time 
to emulate and spoof the device. 
 
Fig. 1. Photonic PUF operation. A binary challenge sequence spectrally 
encodes a train of ultrashort optical pulses, exciting many spatial modes in the 
silicon micro-cavity and generating a unique spectro-temporal response that is 
converted into a binary sequence. Inset: Scanning electron microscope (SEM) 
image of prototype device. 
Here we experimentally and theoretically investigate the 
information capacity (the number of random bits of 
information that it can store) of these novel photonic PUFs. 
Compared to existing optical PUFs [7]–[11], these devices 
demonstrate unprecedented information density and generation 
rates. This paper focuses on the impact of the device 
nonlinearity on the total information content. Consequently, we 
make the following new contributions: 
• Nonlinearity: We exploit the natural nonlinearity of 
silicon to achieve enhanced security and resistance to 
model-building attacks. Our experimental results 
validate the nonlinear operation of the device. 
• Enhanced Information Density: Nonlinearity affords 
substantial improvements in information density over 
OSPUFs, as the number of uncorrelated response 
patterns is bounded by the number of unique challenge 
patterns [8] up to a resolution set by the minimum 
feature size of the spectral response. These compact 
micro-cavities are much smaller than current OSPUFs, 
which is critical to enhancing information density. 
• Ultrafast Information Generation Rate: Due to the 
ultrafast nature of the approach, we demonstrate 
continuous challenge-response measurements at a rate 
of 90-MHz yielding noteworthy improvements over 
the best OSPUFs demonstrated to date. 
II. NONLINEAR SILICON CHAOTIC CAVITIES 
A. Information Model 
Experimentally we extract key information from the 
cavities in the following manner. A novel ultrafast pulse shaper 
spectrally encodes the amplitude of each laser pulse as follows 
[21]: Dispersion compensating fiber (DCF) is used to 
temporally disperse the individual pulses of a mode-locked 
laser (MLL) pulse stream. The temporally-dispersed spectra 
are then amplitude encoded by symbols of a pseudorandom 
binary sequence (PRBS) that is synchronized to the MLL. 
After spectral patterning, the pulses are compressed in time, 
amplified via an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA), and 
launched into the cavity where the complex nonlinear photonic 
interaction occurs. The optical pulses exiting the cavity are 
then pre-amplified for detection. The pulses are spectrally 
filtered to extract information from each response. The filtered 
pulse is detected and passed to an analog-to-digital convertor. 
 
Fig. 2. Spectro-temporal input and output mapping. The device uses a time-
frequency interrogation method across an input space bounded by the total 
spectral bandwidth and the cavity lifetime. These input symbols are mapped 
to time-frequency output symbols through the application of a transmission 
matrix in a linear system and an arbitrary function in a nonlinear system. 
The input pulse is composed of multiple spectral input 
features of width ∆f and temporal features of duration ∆t that 
are bounded by (1) the total spectral bandwidth Ω, which is 
limited by the bandwidth of the input MLL source, and (2) the 
total cavity lifetime, τ, i.e. the time in which symbols may 
interact with each other (Fig. 2). These features are used to 
define the ith temporal and jth spectral feature of each symbol, 
sij. The total number of input time slots, mi, is given by mi = 
τ/∆t, where ∆t is an arbitrary temporal feature size. Thus, it is 
desirable to maximize the cavity lifetime in order to gain the 
maximum interaction between input symbols. The cavity 
lifetime is influenced by the precise shape of the cavity, the 
material loss properties, and the refractive index contrast at the 
boundary between the cavity and surrounding cladding. The 
number of spectral features mj of an input is the total frequency 
bandwidth Ω divided by the input spectral feature size, ∆fin, i.e. 
mf  = Ω/∆fin. This input spectral feature size may be chosen 
arbitrarily but is limited by the modulation approach [21] and 
the subsequent correlation of excited responses (Section 3). In 
order to maximize the number of possible symbols, we can 
choose the time slot to be related to the inverse of the spectral 
feature, i.e. ∆fin  = 1/∆t. The maximum number of input 
symbols is then m = mimj = (Ω/∆fin)(τ/∆t). By substituting this 
time-frequency relationship, we achieve m = Ωτ, or the total 
frequency bandwidth multiplied by the cavity lifetime. Each of 
these symbols can be encoded with a bits of information via 
spectral amplitude and/or phase encoding for g = 2a levels.  
Likewise, our detection approach is also spectro-temporal, 
i.e. energy may be measured in both time and frequency. The 
cavity lifetime τ and spectral bandwidth Ω are equivalent for 
both the input and output. We assume that each spectral 
response has a finite autocorrelation within some average 
spectral feature size ∆fout and is zero outside of that bound. This 
estimate provides insight into the number of independent 
features contained within a response pf and is determined by 
dividing the total bandwidth Ω by the spectral feature size, i.e. 
pf = Ω/∆fout. Each one of these features can be detected with a 
depth of b bits (typically b = 8 bits for h = 2b levels).  
Notably, there is no reduction in dimensionality versus 
three-dimensional OSPUFs, which are interrogated and read in 
a two-dimensional spatial basis as they are time-invariant. In 
contrast, our approach is dynamic in time and is thus three-
dimensional (2D space and time) and is interrogated and read 
in a two-dimensional time-frequency basis as described above. 
Further, being spatially 2D (i.e. planar) is crucial for direct 
integration with semiconductor electronics. 
B. Nonlinearity, Information Content, and Security 
In a linear system, the mapping from input symbol s to 
output symbol r may be represented by a mi × mj transmission 
matrix, T [9], [10]. Each output symbol may be represented as 
a linear combination of the input symbols by the relation r = T ⋅ 
s. The maximum number of orthogonal rows of such a matrix 
is equivalent to its rank. An adversary can compute the inverse 
or pseudoinverse of T to obtain, exactly or approximately, the 
input given the output. In a nonlinear system, the transmission 
function is a system of nonlinear equations for which no such 
inversion exists. 
The property of nonlinearity is ideal for the construction of 
a PUF [7]–[9] as it breaks the linear dependencies that permit 
successful model building attacks and further enables the 
desired PUF properties of unpredictability and unclonability 
[2]. The majority of nonlinear systems remain impossible to 
solve analytically [22] as each such system is inherently 
coupled with aspects of itself, vastly complicating the search 
for an analytic representation of its behavior. Due to the 
susceptibility of OSPUFs to model-building attacks [9], finding 
suitable nonlinear materials for these devices remains a central 
open research problem which we do not address here. Further, 
the high input power levels that would be required to observe 
nonlinear behavior in current OSPUF materials are currently 
avoided due to the impracticality of such sources and the 
permanent device deformation that would fundamentally 
change the PUF response, rendering it unable to authenticate to 
previously enrolled authentication terminals [7], [11]. In 
contrast, our photonic PUFs readily exhibit nonlinear behavior 
due to the enhancement of the interaction time and optical 
intensity that accompanies the high optical confinement micro-
resonant geometry and the naturally high nonlinearity of 
silicon [23]. To harness this nonlinearity, we excite a large 
number of long-lived optical cavity modes that nonlinearly mix 
with each other to maximize the spatial and spectro-temporal 
complexity of the interaction. To this end, silicon provides a 
high refractive index contrast with the silica cladding, thus 
improving cavity lifetime and confinement. 
 
Fig. 3. Observed four-wave mixing in the photonic PUF. (a) An input signal 
consisting of two 150 GHz spectral features centered at ω1 = 191.94 THz and 
ω2 = 192.43 THz are amplified to an average power of 9.58 mW and sent 
through the silicon cavity. Optical power is observed at two new frequencies, 
ω3 = 191.57 THz and ω4 = 192.80 THz, as expected for this process. (b) 
Energy level diagram of FWM and optical frequency relationships. 
Previous work [16] investigated the change in the output 
signal in both time and frequency as a function of power to 
characterize the nonlinear behavior, taking steps to ensure the 
invariance of the input laser spectrum. Such experimental 
measurements do not inform the precise source of the 
nonlinearity; however, several types are certainly present to 
varying degrees. In silicon, nonlinear effects are known to 
include self-phase modulation (SPM), two-photon absorption 
(TPA), cross-phase modulation (XPM), four-wave mixing 
(FWM), stimulated Raman scattering (SRS), and free-carrier 
induced absorption and dispersion. These effects and their 
power thresholds are well known and readily observed [23]. 
For example, we show the presence of FWM in a typical 
prototype device where two narrowband inputs nonlinearly 
interact to create light at new frequencies (Fig. 3). 
III. INFORMATION CONTENT OF PHOTONIC PUFS 
A. Information Content Estimation Approach 
In order to quantify the number of useful random bits, N, 
from the ideal photonic PUF device, we address the limiting 
physical phenomena [10]. First, correlations between features 
of each spectral response may limit the size of extractable 
information. Second, correlations among the set of possible 
spectral responses form an upper bound on the number of 
uncorrelated random responses from each device. The post-
processing operations remove such correlations by reducing the 
number of output bits from each response [16]. We determine 
an approximate upper bound on the information content from 
the photonic PUF derived from experimental measurements, 
based upon the product of the number of random bits per 
spectral response β and the total number of uncorrelated 
spectral responses n per device [10]: N ≤ β ⋅ n. 
B. Bits per Spectral Response 
As our demonstrated system operates in a single time 
interval (mi = 1) and uses a spectral filter to access several 
frequency components, the number of bits in a given response 
is the total spectral bandwidth, Ω, divided by the feature size of 
the spectral response, ∆fout, multiplied by the bits per detected 
feature, b, i.e. β ≤ (Ω/∆fout) b. First, we experimentally 
characterize our devices to determine the average feature size 
of the spectral output. We measure the input spectrum of a 
300-fs full-wave half-maximum (FWHM) pulse train, send 
those pulses into a cavity at the transverse-electric (TE), 
transverse-magnetic (TM), and 45° cross-polarized (XP) 
polarization states, and measure the spectral response of 23 
distinct cavities. We calculated ∆fout as the FWHM of the 
averaged normalized autocorrelation function [24] resulting in 
103.1±20.3 GHz for TE, 88.4±20.2 GHz for TM, and 
46.9±24.2 GHz for XP (Fig. 4a). Hence, our rough estimate for 
an upper bound on the number of bits per response of our 
demonstrated 5-THz spectral bandwidth system is βTE ≤ 388 
bits, βTM ≤ 452 bits, and βXP ≤ 853 bits. 
 
Fig. 4. Response characterization data. (a) Photonic PUF average feature size 
calculated as the FWHM of the normalized spectrum autocorrelation function 
for the TE, TM, and XP polarizations from 23 unique devices. (b) The 
spectral probability mass function is measured for the three polarizations. 
Next, we refine the estimate of the number of random bits 
contained within each spectral response β via calculating the 
entropy rate [10], H(ν), of the PUF spectral output ν from 
several devices. We first determine the spectral probability 
mass function from the measured spectral responses (Fig. 4b) 
normalized by mean and variance [24]. We then calculate H(ν) 
from the spectral probability mass function at our three 
polarizations to be 5.89 for TE, 5.97 for TM, and 5.42 for XP. 
We revise our estimate for the total random bits per spectral 
response as β = (Ω/∆fout) H(ν) resulting in βTE = 286 bits, βTM 
=338 bits, and βXP = 578 bits. 
C. Number of Uncorrelated Spectral Responses per Device 
The number of uncorrelated spectral responses per device n 
may be estimated experimentally. Due to the system’s 
nonlinearity, the decorrelation of the resultant binary 
representation of the output is critical for determining the total 
number of uncorrelated responses. We compute this correlation 
via the fractional Hamming distance (FHD) between two 
binary sequences generated from unique spectral responses. 
We experimentally characterize the correlation of the 
photonic PUF output spectra due to small changes to input 
spectra (Fig. 5a) at the TE polarization state. First, we generate 
a 67-feature frequency grid across the MLL input spectrum 
from 191.2-193.7 THz (2.5 THz) via a programmable spectral 
filter, yielding an input feature size of 37.3 GHz (emulating our 
authentication pulse shaping approach). Next, we generate a 
single pseudorandom binary input pattern and then 67 
subsequent patterns each differing from the previous pattern by 
a single bit for 68 patterns in total. These patterns are 
sequentially encoded onto the broadband spectrum of the 
optical pulses, amplified, and measured before and after the 
cavity with an optical spectrum analyzer (OSA). In post-
processing, we applied orthogonal, order-32, Hadamard 
sequences to channelize the output and extract spectral 
information (channel feature size of 78.1 GHz to be 
comparable with average feature size of the cavity) from each 
response. We then converted these channels into binary 
sequences by extracting five bits per channel (155 bits total). 
Due to the space limit, we will report more details of our post-
processing approach in the full version of this paper. 
 
Fig. 5. Response correlation and nonlinear verification experimental setup. 
(a) Experimental characterization of the sensitivity of output binary sequences 
to small changes in the input spectra. Multiple input patterns were generated, 
differing by a single bit, and sent through the cavity at the TE polarization 
state. The responses were converted into binary sequences and compared via 
FHD. (b) Spectral transfer functions were computed for each unique input and 
output, applied to different input patterns in post-processing, and then 
converted to binary. The FHD was computed between binary sequences 
corresponding to different transfer functions applied to the same input pattern. 
To ensure independence of binary responses from our 
demonstrated system, we evaluated the entropy of keys as 
follows (Fig. 6a). With an input source of 2.5 THz of 
bandwidth, we expect to extract β = (2.5 THz / 103.1 GHz) ⋅ 
5.89 ≈ 143 bits per response. We calculate the entropy as 149 
bits which is within the expected extractable information 
bound based upon the variance of our minimum feature 
measurements. We also characterized output binary response 
decorrelation as a function of deviation between input patterns 
(Fig. 6b). These results indicate that even a single bit difference 
between two input patterns will result in fully decorrelated 
binary responses from their corresponding outputs thereby 
satisfying the avalanche criterion [4]. 
 Fig. 6.  Response correlation results. (a) FHD distribution between binary 
responses generated from PUF responses from deviated input patterns. The 
mean of this distribution is 0.498 and the standard deviation is 0.041, resulting 
in an entropy of [0.498×(1−0.498)]/0.0412=149 bits. (b) Correlation of output 
binary sequences by input pattern deviation (two standard deviation bounds). 
In order to further verify the nonlinear behavior of the 
system, we first assume linear operation by calculating and 
analyzing the transfer functions corresponding to each pair of 
unique input and output spectra. In post-processing, we applied 
every combination of those transfer functions to each unique 
input to calculate 67 new outputs (Fig. 5b). We then converted 
each new output spectrum into a 155-bit sequence per our post-
processing algorithm. We calculated the FHD of each 
reconstructed output with the originally measured output and 
determined the correlation between binary responses as a 
function of the deviation of the input pattern corresponding to 
the applied response (Fig. 7). The results indicate that output 
sequences based upon responses calculated from minutely 
varying inputs cause full decorrelation of the expected binary 
sequence thus showing that the behavior depends on the input 
sequence and that the device is verified to be nonlinear. 
 
Fig. 7. Nonlinear verification results. (a) Nonlinear FHD distribution 
between binary responses generated from transfer functions from deviated 
input patterns. (b) Correlation of nonlinearly reconstructed binary sequences 
by input pattern deviation (two standard deviation bounds). 
In the nonlinear regime, the responses do not add linearly 
or coherently, so the PUF can use many more challenges than 
in the linear case [7], [8]. Thus, the number of possible patterns 
forms an upper bound for information content computation 
and, the ideal upper bound on the total number of independent 
spectral responses is n ≤ gΩτ. Our demonstrated ultrafast pulse 
shaper spectrally encodes the amplitude of each pulse to 
achieve 94 binary features within the 3-dB bandwidth (4.2 
THz) of each pulse for ∆fin = 44.2 GHz [21]. Likewise, we 
reduce the depth of the input to a single bit, i.e. g = 2 levels, as 
our modulation approach is binary. Since our demonstrated 
system effectively integrates the response over time, we revise 
our upper bound to be limited by the number of input features 
across the spectral bandwidth, i.e. n ≤ 2Ω/∆fin = 294. 
D. Total Bits per Device and Ideal Upper Bound 
Using β and n as computed above, we may now calculate 
an upper bound on the total number of random bits of our 
prototype photonic PUF as follows: 
 NTE  ≤ βTE ⋅ n ≈ 1022 Gbits  (1) 
For the device area of 707 µm2, this yields a 2D 
information density of 1022 Tbits/mm2. However, in the above 
analysis, the input optical bandwidth is limited by our 
experimental setup. Future work can employ a wider input 
bandwidth to extract much more information. While the low 
loss transmission window of silicon is 1.1 to 7 µm (229.9 
THz), a practical system might use the near-infrared 
telecommunications band of 1.26 to 1.675 µm (59.0 THz). 
Also, we may further increase the information content through 
the use of orthogonal polarization states and by extending the 
input depth to more bits via phase and amplitude coding (e.g. g 
= 24 levels) such that the input space is increased. Thus, we can 
estimate a theoretical upper bound: 
 N
 
 ≤ 2Ωτ H(ν) gΩτ ≈ 10847 Gbits  (2) 
This very optimistic upper limit suggests that future 
systems should continue to improve on information density and 
performance. While our experimental results (Figs. 5-7) 
suggest that an adversary cannot predict any new output from 
the observation of other input-output behavior, future research 
is needed to evaluate the extent to which the PUF continues to 
generate independent outputs in those conditions and therefore 
how close to this upper limit the PUF can operate. 
E. Performance Comparison 
We now compare the results of our photonic PUF against 
various OSPUF demonstrations in key performance metrics of 
information generation rate, information content, and 
information density (Table 1). As OSPUFs continue to make 
use of linear materials and configurations, they continue to 
suffer from reduced information content. Our nonlinear 
photonic PUF provides an 18 order-of-magnitude improvement 
in information content due to the ability to leverage the entire 
challenge space. Further, given the large physical size of 
OSPUFs, in part due to requirements for free-space 
propagation, they are prohibitively difficult to integrate with 
electronic circuits and suffer from low information density. In 
contrast, our PUF is planar and is < 160 µm3 or six orders of 
magnitude smaller in volume, resulting in an improvement in 
information density of 27 orders of magnitude. Lastly, due to 
the ultrafast nature of the cavity, we can acquire [16] a 
measurement every 11 ns (seven orders of magnitude faster 
that previous OSPUF demonstrations) yielding ≥ 2 bits of key 
material with an overall key generation rate of over 180 Mb/s; 
a two order-of-magnitude improvement over the best OSPUFs 
demonstrated to date. Ultimately, the measurement speed is 
limited only by the minimum feature size, i.e. ~80 GHz 
features yielding a minimum of 12 ps per measurement. 
TABLE I.  OPTICAL PUF QUANTITATIVE PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
PUF Type PUF Performance Metrics 
Year Info. Rate 
[bps] 
Info. 
Limit 
[Gbits] 
Volume 
[mm3] 
Info. 
Density 
[Tbit/mm3] 
OSPUF with 
Probe [7], [8] 2002 233 5522 254 0.022 
OSPUF with 
SLM [10]a 2013 2×10
6
 151 0.151 1 
Integrated 
OSPUF [9]b 2013 1.3×10
5
 ?b 250b ?b 
Photonic PUF 
[16], [17] 2016 1.8×10
8
 1022 1.6×10-7 6.3×1025 
a.
 Used for secure communications and encryption 
b.
 Estimated/data not available 
Beyond information content, the small size of the micro-
cavities and their ultrafast nature contribute to the overall 
security of this approach. All previous PUFs claim that 
emulation is difficult; however, those claims are based purely 
qualitatively on the difficulty of building an emulation device. 
For an OSPUF, such a system would be required to respond in 
a fraction of a second. In comparison, to emulate our device, 
the system would need to begin responding in half of the cavity 
round-trip time or < 0.6 ps and complete its response in less 
than 12 ps to avoid detection. While construction of both 
emulation systems would be difficult, to do so with our 
approach is completely unforeseeable using any current 
processing or memory technology. For example, an adversary 
would be required to store at least half of a complete challenge-
response library (CRL) of 1028 bits (10,000 yottabits) of 
information in an area of < 707 µm2 so as not to violate the 
speed of information being bounded by the speed of light [25]. 
This lower bound density of 1013 Tbits/µm2 is many orders of 
magnitude denser than any current 2D memory technology 
[26] and this assumes that other emulation components have 
zero latency, which is clearly not the case. Thus, we argue that 
our infeasibility of emulation is more tangible than any 
previous claim as it is based on strict physical limits. 
IV. SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we show that the nonlinear behavior of this 
new class of photonic PUFs is essential to achieve 
revolutionary advancements in total information content, 
information density, and information generation rates for 
optical PUFs. We envision such unspoofable keys directly 
integrated, at the point of manufacture, into the same silicon 
layer as the microelectronics. Due to the compact micron-scale 
footprint, keys can be incorporated into individual chips, 
ensuring authenticity and integrity at any subsequent stage. 
Finally, the keys are probed optically, allowing them to be 
either independent of the microelectronic circuit, or 
intrinsically linked via optoelectronic interfaces. Future work 
in this area will focus on continuing to improve the 
performance via the investigation of wider bandwidth sources, 
the use of rapid spectro-temporal multilevel amplitude and 
phase encoding, and temporal multiplexing to enhance key 
generation rates. We also envision the development of new 
designs that provide for longer photon lifetimes and increased 
nonlinearity, thus further increasing the information content. 
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